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ABSTRACT 9 
Geotechnical uncertainty may be the most difficult risk to manage in construction. In Design-10 
Build (DB), where the project’s price is fixed before design and in many cases the subsurface 11 
investigation is complete, the risk profile is fundamentally changed and the owner must address 12 
it. This paper assesses the potential of DB as a tool for addressing geotechnical uncertainty in 13 
public transportation projects by comparatively evaluating three successful approaches. The first 14 
case study involves the use of a Geotechnical Baseline Report as a subsurface condition risk 15 
allocation tool. The second uses unit price pay items inside the larger lump sum contract to share 16 
the geotechnical risk with the design-builder. Finally, a “nested DB” landslide repair clause 17 
inside a design-bid-build interstate highway contract successfully addressed the post-award 18 
potential landslide risk. The paper concludes that each of the contractual management 19 
approaches provided an effective means for addressing geotechnical uncertainty in DB public 20 
transportation projects. 21 
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INTRODUCTION  29 
A thorough geotechnical investigation is typically conducted as part of a transportation project’s 30 
design process, and it is common practice to prepare a geotechnical design report (GDR) for use 31 
in designing subsurface project features such as foundations (WSDOT 2004). The tunneling 32 
industry takes the subsurface investigation and analysis to a more detailed level by developing a 33 
geotechnical baseline report (GBR) to act as a benchmark against which potential differing site 34 
conditions can be compared. It also permits a more equitable sharing of the risk associated with 35 
subsurface uncertainty with its contracting community, which is intended to reduce risk-36 
associated contingencies in the bidding process (Dwyre et al. 2010). Regardless of the amount of 37 
sampling, testing and analysis that occurs prior to completing a project’s design, the project’s 38 
owner may still find itself liable for differing site conditions found after construction has 39 
commenced, making geotechnical risk management a difficult aspect for projects delivered using 40 
traditional design-bid-build (DBB) (Christensen and Meeker 2002). The geotechnical risk profile 41 
changes in design-build (DB) project delivery in a manner that potentially drives project success. 42 
A DBB project’s design is finished before advertising the construction contract, but the design-43 
builder completes both the design and the construction under a single contract in DB. As such, 44 
DB project delivery may involve the possibility that the subsurface geotechnical investigation 45 
will be undertaken by the DB contractor after executing a fixed price contract. That factor begs 46 
the question: how much investigation, if any, should the owner do prior to advertising the DB 47 
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contract to characterize the geotechnical conditions upon which competing design-build teams 48 
will base their proposed price? 49 
 50 
The highway construction industry is a somewhat late entrant into the use of DB project delivery. 51 
While public agencies have used it to some degree on vertical projects for at least four decades, it 52 
wasn’t until the Utah Department of Transportation turned to DB as the only way to accelerate 53 
the highway construction required for the 2002 Winter Olympics that the industry saw it as a 54 
potential procurement tool (FHWA 2006). A major reason for not using DB until recently relates 55 
to the relative physical scales of building projects and highway projects. In building construction 56 
contracts, the probability that differing subsurface conditions will impact an architectural project 57 
is essentially limited to the building’s footprint. However, a highway project’s footprint is not 58 
only larger in area but also linear in shape, which greatly increases the probability that a differing 59 
site condition will be encountered. Add to that the fact that many public utilities are installed in 60 
the right of way of the nation’s roads and the likelihood that the owner will be exposed to a 61 
serious differing site conditions claim greatly increases (Lee et al. 2015). 62 
According to a study completed by FHWA, public transportation agencies tend to reserve DB 63 
delivery for projects that must conform to an accelerated schedule (FHWA 2006). This shortens 64 
the time available for both the owner and the successful DB team to conduct the subsurface 65 
investigations/analyses needed to quantify and mitigate the DB project’s geotechnical risk. 66 
Additionally, the DB contractor is typically obligated to establish a firm fixed price during the 67 
bidding process before the design is complete and often before any new subsurface 68 
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investigations have been undertaken. This forces the design-builder to include contingencies for 69 
the risk that the geotechnical design assumptions that were made during the bidding process turn 70 
out to be wrong. Those contingencies are paid by the owner whether or not they are actually 71 
realized due to the nature of a lump sum construction contract (McLain et al. 2014). 72 
 73 
Additionally, the very physical nature of how a highway project is built adds fuel to the 74 
subsurface uncertainty fire because the subsurface construction activities are the first features of 75 
work that must be constructed, making them also the first technical features whose design must 76 
be completed (Gransberg and Gad 2014). This issue becomes especially acute when there is a 77 
need to release early design work packages for construction before the entire design has been 78 
finished. The result is an enormous pressure for the owner’s geotechnical engineers to truncate 79 
the traditional pre-award subsurface investigation, analysis, and design process to support the 80 
accelerated completion of the entire project. 81 
An additional issue that the agency must also address is the contracting policy question of how 82 
much information should be provided to competing DB teams regarding the character of the 83 
geotechnical site conditions in the DB Request for Proposals (RFP) (Blanchard 2007, Dwyre et 84 
al. 2010).  One school of thought maintains that the more information that is provided, the more 85 
likely it is that the design-builder can submit a competitive proposal because the contingencies 86 
for geotechnical risk contained in the price proposal can be reduced (Christensen and Meeker 87 
2002).  Additionally, this may provide the agency with enhanced certainty of expected project 88 
cost (Kim et al. 2009). Another school believes that increasing the amount of subsurface 89 
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information merely increases the chance that it will be found different during construction, 90 
resulting in claims under the contract’s differing site conditions clause (Rueda-Benavides and 91 
Gransberg 2015). However, because the DB delivery process has proven to be an effective 92 
means of compressing project delivery periods to their shortest states (FHWA 2006), there is 93 
frequently an incentive for the DOT to start the procurement process before a robust geotechnical 94 
program has been performed (Higbee 2004, Kim et al. 2009).  All of this creates potential risks 95 
to both parties that are not present in a DBB delivery process (WSDOT 2004).   96 
Therefore, managing geotechnical risk in DB projects is both important and timely.  Given the 97 
high level of potential risk, there are public agencies that have sought and found contractual 98 
approaches to both manage and mitigate subsurface construction risk. As such, this paper will 99 
report how three public transportation agencies successfully leveraged the DB delivery process 100 
itself to address geotechnical uncertainty and resolve specific geotechnical issues.   101 
METHODOLOGY 102 
Case study research is best used to conduct an in-depth look at promising procurement processes 103 
such as DB (Eisenhardt 1991). Case studies help find the details of the “how and why” aspects 104 
for the project of interest. This is especially true for studies that examine a number of different 105 
cases (Yin 2008). The research team developed a defensible, repeatable methodology to direct 106 
the case study process. A variety of research methods were used, including multiple sources of 107 
information, maintaining a chain of evidence, and searching for patterns among the data through 108 
data coding (Taylor et al. 2009, Yin 2008).  In-depth case study research was essential in this 109 
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study to obtain the details of how different public agencies used DB project delivery as a risk 110 
management tool to address geotechnical uncertainty.  111 
The research team developed a structured interview protocol with yes/no questions, checklists, 112 
matrices, and open-ended questions. The structured interview protocol facilitated understanding 113 
the uniqueness of each case study while having a standard output with which to analyze and 114 
conduct cross-case comparisons. Case study project candidates were identified from the 115 
literature, and each agency was contacted to identify a knowledgeable individual involved in the 116 
project with whom an interview could be arranged. The interview questionnaire was emailed to 117 
each interviewee one week before the scheduled interview to permit them time to gather the 118 
necessary information and documents for the case study. A copy of each DB project’s RFP was 119 
requested that included all the applicable the geotechnical design criteria, soil profile 120 
information, test reports, etc. that would comprise the information upon which competing 121 
design-builders would have to base their proposals. 122 
The researchers interviewed the agency’s project manager for the Missouri and Montana projects 123 
and the DB contractor’s project director on the Hawaiian project. The interviews were conducted 124 
in person with one researcher acting as the interviewer with a second researcher taking notes. 125 
The DB solicitation documents were also reviewed during the interview to ensure that their 126 
meaning was fully understood by the research team. After the structured interviews, each agency 127 
was furnished a copy of the draft case study reports and asked to verify the accuracy of the 128 
information contained in it. The case study details provided in the paper flow directly from the 129 
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case study structured interviews and are supplemented by additional specifics found about the 130 
individual projects from the project documentation and elsewhere in the literature. 131 
Case Study Selection and Demographics 132 
Three case studies were selected for inclusion in this paper to highlight specific geotechnical 133 
issues that were addressed by using DB project delivery. It should be noted that they are a 134 
portion of a larger study which included a total of seven projects (Gransberg and Loulakis 2011). 135 
The case studies represent a cross section of variations in geotechnical uncertainty. The 136 
approaches may be generalized to other contracts or circumstances to address geotechnical 137 
uncertainty. The following ranges were considered when selecting the case studies found in this 138 
paper: 139 
 Range of project types – roads and bridges  140 
 Range of project size – small project to large 141 
 Range of project location – regionally dispersed 142 
 Range of solicitation type – Invitation for Bids (IFB) to Request for Qualifications 143 
(RFQ)/RFP 144 
 Range of payment provisions – lump sum (LS) to time and materials  145 
 Range of project cost - $0.55 million to $483 million 146 
The three cases shown in Table 1 were specifically selected because the agency used DB as a 147 
contractual tool to address geotechnical risk, whereas the other four cases in the larger study 148 
merely reported the outcomes when differing site conditions were encountered. In others words, 149 
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the three selected cases represent an agency that recognized the geotechnical risk potential in 150 
each project and then selected a carefully crafted tool to manage the risk using DB project 151 
delivery, presenting a proactive rather than reactive solution. The Table 1 is a summary of the 152 
salient characteristics of three case study projects analyzed in the paper.  153 
TABLE 1. Case Study Project Summary 154 
Agency 
 
Case Study 
Project  
(Value) 
Project Type 
(location) 
Geotechnical Risk 
Management/Mitigation Tool 
Payment 
Provision Type 
City & 
County of 
Honolulu 
Section I - West 
Oahu/Farmington 
Highway 
($483 million) 
Elevated Commuter 
Rail Guideway 
(Honolulu, Hawaii) 
Use of GBR as DB contract risk 
allocation mechanism to mitigate 
potential contingencies for 
geotechnical uncertainty during 
procurement. 
Lump Sum 
Montana 
DOT 
US Highway 2 
Rockfall 
Mitigation 
($3.0 million) 
Rockfall mitigation 
features 
(Flathead County, 
Montana) 
Use of a unit price provision to 
mitigate risk of geotechnical 
risks that could not be quantified 
until construction start. 
Lump Sum with 
Unit Price items 
Missouri 
DOT 
I-270 – St. Louis 
County Slide 
Repair 
($0.55 million) 
Emergency landslide 
remediation on 
interstate highway 
(St Louis County, 
Missouri) 
Use of a “nested” DB contract 
provision in a DBB contract with 
known geotechnical issues to 
respond to a major geotechnical 
risk if it is realized. 
Time & 
Materials 
 155 
 156 
CASE STUDY DETAILS AND ANALYSIS 157 
The objective of this section is to portray the breadth and depth of the case study project 158 
population and analyze how DB project delivery was an effective means to provide geotechnical 159 
solutions and manage risk for transportation agencies. The format has been standardized for each 160 
project to enable each project to be compared with all other projects in the sample (Taylor et al. 161 
2009).  162 
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West O’ahu/Farrington Highway Guideway Project, Section I—City and County of 163 
Honolulu, Hawaii (CCH) 164 
This project involved the construction of 6.5 miles of elevated rail guideway resting on columns/ 165 
piers spaced at roughly 150 ft. This yields approximately 220 column/pier structures that support 166 
the elevated guideway. Salient elements of this case study are as follows: 167 
 Geotechnical Scope: The project included about 220 separate foundations in conditions 168 
that included old and recent alluvium, localized areas of coralline deposits, isolated 169 
boulders and boulder fields, residual soils, and basalt bedrock. The owner anticipated that 170 
drilled shafts would be proposed for the majority of the alignment because they are 171 
usually less expensive and equipment and materials are usually readily available. (CCH 172 
2008). 173 
 Rationale for selecting DB project delivery: CCH chose DB project delivery because it 174 
wanted to award quickly to capture a drop in construction costs (Petrello 2009) and to 175 
allow design optimization by DB Team (Dwyre et al. 2010).  176 
 Procurement: The project used a typical two-step process, with CCH first issuing an RFQ 177 
from which it developed a short list. It then issued an RFP to the members of the short 178 
list. The major technical issue that had to be resolved in the development of the RFP was 179 
to equitably allocate the risk of differing subsurface conditions. The owner settled on the 180 
use of a GBR to mitigate the significant risk of delay and/or cost escalation (Dwyre et al. 181 
2010). The owner’s geotechnical consultant chose to establish the baselines for each soil 182 
type. This was developed using preliminary geotechnical data obtained from a boring 183 
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program with a spacing of roughly one boring every 1,000 ft. Because the design-builder 184 
had authority to vary the alignment, this particular data set could easily be off the final 185 
alignment.  Table 2 provides a summary of the GBR used to quantify the subsurface 186 
material properties risk. 187 
Table 2: Geotechnical Baseline Report Baselines (adapted from Dwyer et al 2010) 188 
Parameter Stratigraphy Baselines Material Property Baselines 
Coralline Undistributed quantity, not shown on subsurface 
profile 
•  % -#200 
•  %stratum depth cemented 
•  Unconfined strength range 
Recent 
Alluvium 
Subsurface profile •  USCS types 
•  Average shear strength by station reach 
Older 
Alluvium 
Subsurface profile •  USCS types 
•  Average shear strength by station 
reach 
Cobbles and 
Boulders 
Lengths of foundation in cobble/boulder 
zone 
•  Thickness ranges of clinker and 
void zones 
Clinker and 
Voids 
Percent of foundations where 
clinker/voids will be present 
•  Thickness ranges of clinker and 
void zones 
Rock Subsurface profile line, with upper/lower bounds 
for planning construction means and methods 
•  Minimum RQD for specified 
percentage of core run 
•  UCS 
Groundwater 
elevations 
Varying groundwater conditions shown 
on profile 
•  Water table or confined aquifer 
USCS = Unified Soil Classification System; UCS=Unconfined compressive strength;  
RQD = Rock Quality Designation 
 189 
 Quality Management (QM): The agency’s general engineering consultant was responsible 190 
for most of the day-to-day QM tasks. The project also required considerable interaction 191 
between the design-builder and the agency’s consultant. Note that the two-dimensional 192 
Refraction Microtremor (2D ReMi) method was successfully used to map soft soil zones 193 
under the Farrington and the Kamehameha Highways, both of which support high traffic 194 
volumes, without the need to interrupt traffic flow (Sirles and Batchko 2010). This is 195 
example of innovation that was brought to the project by the use of DB project delivery. 196 
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 Summary: The project’s award price was 15% less than expected indicating that the use of 197 
the GBR as a means to allocate risk was successful. Multiyear DB projects of this 198 
magnitude with significant geotechnical risks typically carry large contingencies inside the 199 
price proposal (Finley 2010). The CCH actually saved $87 million. Although it is 200 
impossible to know what percentage of the savings is due to lower construction prices, at 201 
least some of it must be assigned to a lower design-builder’s contingency owing to the 202 
well-defined geotechnical risk. 203 
US 2 Rockfall Mitigation Project - Flathead County, Montana DOT (MDT) 204 
This project involved the design and construction of rockfall mitigation measures and slope 205 
stabilization along 14 miles of US Highway 2 east of West Glacier, Montana. Traffic control is a 206 
major issue on this job because the road provides access to Glacier National Park. Salient 207 
elements of this case study are as follows: 208 
 Geotechnical scope:  The project identified six reaches that must be mitigated and two 209 
more to be fixed if the contract funding is available. The project includes scaling, draped 210 
rockfall protection, trim blasting, and other techniques as may be determined by the design-211 
builder. 212 
 Rationale for selecting DB project delivery: MDT chose DB project delivery because it 213 
appeared to be the best method for sharing the risk of geotechnical uncertainty. The 214 
preferred rockfall mitigation method was to scale the rock faces back to a safe angle of 215 
repose. However, there is no economical method for determining the angle by any other 216 
method than field trial. As a result, completing the design before executing the construction 217 
contract carried an unacceptable risk because of the high potential for differing site 218 
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conditions changes/claims. The project had a fixed budget of $3.0 million with no 219 
contingency. MDT originally looked at using a fixed-price best-proposal best-value (BV) 220 
award algorithm (Gransberg and Molenaar 2003). However, MDT’s enabling legislation 221 
requires it to use an adjusted score award algorithm, which requires the price be divided by 222 
the technical score with the lowest adjusted score becoming the BV (MDT 2011). The final 223 
alternative was to develop a unit price approach to those pay items that were expected to 224 
vary in quantities due to in situ geotechnical conditions and bundle the remaining items 225 
into a single lump sum price. 226 
 Procurement:  The partial unit price method allowed the technical proposal to be scored 227 
and did not constrain the competitors to a stipulated price. The RFP included a clause that 228 
made it clear that MDT intended to spend the entire budget for this project and get as much 229 
work done as possible. A “Best and Final Offer” clause provided a remedy if all initial 230 
price proposals exceeded the budget. In essence each responsive competitor would submit a 231 
revised proposal that details the scope of work it could complete for the specified budget. 232 
MDT would then repeat technical scoring and compute the BV based on the adjusted score. 233 
The RFP also explicitly encouraged including alternative technical concepts (ATCs) in the 234 
proposal and made it clear that innovation is encouraged in “means and methods, approach 235 
to the project, rockfall mitigation techniques, use of new products and new uses for 236 
established products.” (MDT2011). The project’s RFP used the following verbiage to 237 
explain how the unit price pay items for the rockfall mitigation work related to the lump 238 
sum bid price for the overall design and construction tasks, and Figure 1 is an extract of the 239 
project’s bid price proposal. 240 
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“The Bid Price Proposal form will include unit prices for the items indicated, a lump 241 
sum price for the remainder of the project scope and the completion date proposed by 242 
the Firm. …Each unit price will be multiplied by the quantity provided by MDT to 243 
determine the total amount for each of the unit price items. The Total Lump Sum for 244 
the project will be calculated by adding the extended sum of the unit price items with 245 
the lump sum amount for the remainder of the project scope. This total lump sum will 246 
be the final.” (MDT 2011) 247 
Figure 1 Design-Build Bid Price Proposal Form with Unit Price Items. (MDT 2011) 248 
 249 
 Quality Management: MDT stayed actively involved in the QM process and shared many 250 
of the design and construction quality assurance tasks with the design-builder. This makes 251 
sense owing to the need to maximize the amount of work completed for the fixed budget. 252 
Joint responsibility also supports the issue that the final design is functionally reliant on 253 
trial and error data obtained in the field during actual scaling operations. It also supports 254 
the potential decision to reduce the number of reaches mitigated if the quantities overrun on 255 
early reaches by ensuring that the agency is actively engaged in verifying the actual angles 256 
of repose for the types of rock faces encountered in the field. 257 
 Summary: MDT’s procurement approach on this project illustrates an alternative for 258 
sharing the risk of geotechnical uncertainty on a DB project. “Unit price contracts are used 259 
for work where it is not possible to calculate the exact quantity of materials that will be 260 
required” (Schexnayder and Mayo 2006). In a lump sum contract, the design-builder bears 261 
the entire quantity risk. Unit pricing for specific features of work inside a lump sum DB 262 
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contract allows the agency to share the risk of the final quantities of work with the 263 
contractor and reduce the price. Requiring a lump sum price in a DB contract forces the 264 
contractor to bid the worst possible case for those items whose quantities cannot be 265 
accurately measured during proposal preparation (Gransberg and Reimer 2009). Thus, it 266 
makes sense to use the DB contract payment provisions to address geotechnical uncertainty 267 
through unit pricing. 268 
I-270 Slide Repair Project, St. Louis County—Missouri DOT 269 
This project involved the design and construction of temporary shoring needed to protect the 270 
interstate traffic as well to allow quick repair of the box culvert after a landslide. Salient 271 
elements of this case study are as follows: 272 
 Geotechnical scope:  Temporary shoring was used to allow the slope to be restored with 273 
shot rock. The project ultimately designed and built a temporary soil nail wall that had 274 
more than 150, 40-ft nails. The design-builder originated this innovative solution to replace 275 
MoDOT’s conventional slide plane removal and replacement technique (McLain 2008). 276 
 Rationale for selecting DB project delivery: MoDOT awarded a DBB project on a 277 
conventional project in this location that contained a “nested” DB provision for repair of 278 
slides during construction by a prequalified geotechnical specialty subcontractor as 279 
required during the contract period. The primary rationale for selecting this form of DB 280 
was to reduce the time the roadway is out of commission and to encourage innovative 281 
methods to decrease the cost of the slope repair projects. 282 
 Procurement: The typical MoDOT process to award a low-bid project includes a 10- to 14-283 
week design review period before a construction contract can be advertised if the project 284 
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costs more than $1.0 million. Added to this is another 3-week period to award the 285 
construction contract. By adding the “nested DB provision” for landslide repairs inside the 286 
DBB contract, MoDOT avoided the delays inherent in developing a new contract or the 287 
issues of getting waivers to react to an emergency requirement. The nested DB provision 288 
required the prime contractor to subcontract this work with a prequalified geotechnical 289 
specialty contractor that had previous experience successfully completing MoDOT slide 290 
repair and other types of projects. 291 
 Quality Management:  Because his DB project was constructed inside a larger DBB 292 
contract, one would expect MoDOT to approach QA in the same manner that it uses for 293 
DBB projects. However, it gave the design-builder the responsibility for QC testing in the 294 
same manner as its DB contract procedures. 295 
 Summary: The project was completed 120 days after the slide damage occurred. The 296 
design took 5 days. These periods compare to an average of 205 days from slide to 297 
construction completion and 50 days for design for two similar projects that were procured 298 
using DBB (McLain and Shane 2009). The use of the soil nail wall permitted the 299 
construction to be completed without closing any lanes on I-270. In a conventional slide 300 
plane removal and replacement method, MoDOT would have needed to close at least one 301 
lane of traffic throughout construction. Figure 2 shows the damage done by the slide. 302 
Figure 2 Interstate Highway 270 landslide damage. (McLain 2008). 303 
 304 
Analysis of Case Studies 305 
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The three cases presented in the previous section represent successful approaches for leveraging 306 
DB project delivery to both mitigate and manage geotechnical risk. This runs counter to the 307 
conventional wisdom expressed in the literature that DB project delivery should be avoided on 308 
projects with high geotechnical uncertainty (Christensen and Meeker 2002, Hoek and Palmieri 309 
1998, Scheepbouwer and Humphries 2011). For example, Blanchard (2007) described the 310 
Florida DOT’s view that projects ““with low risk of unforeseen conditions… [and] low 311 
possibility for significant change during all phases of work” are good candidates for DB project 312 
delivery. Florida DOT also picks projects “that demand an expedited schedule and can be 313 
completed earlier,” making the issue of unforeseen geotechnical conditions even more important. 314 
 315 
Both the Montana and Missouri projects provided examples of how to embed risk mitigation 316 
tools inside the DB contract itself. MDT’s use of selected unit pricing permitted it to share the 317 
quantity of work risk with the DB contractor and more interestingly, to provide a payment 318 
scheme where the total risk was capped by the $3 million contract ceiling. The idea here was to 319 
use every dollar of available to funding to get as much work done as possible by exploiting the 320 
contractual mechanisms for over and underruns in actual quantities. Thus, if actual quantities of 321 
scaling exceeded the estimated because the actual angle of repose of the scaled surface was less 322 
than estimated, MDT would stop the contractor when the total cost hit the budget ceiling. On the 323 
other hand if those quantities were less, then MDT could have the contractor continue on the 324 
project until it hit the maximum cost. MoDOT’s “nested DB clause” inside a DBB project 325 
provided it a means to expeditiously repair a landslide if one occurred and when it did, the 326 
process was completed in 120 days, nearly three months faster that two previous landslides 327 
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without the nested clause (McLain 2008). Both MoDOT and MDT anticipated the potential 328 
geotechnical risks and provided contractual mechanisms and remedies to mitigate their impact 329 
when they were realized.  330 
The Honolulu project also anticipated the potential for differing site conditions claims, but 331 
instead of adding post-award contractual approaches to address it like the previous two cases, it 332 
chose to invest in a more thorough subsurface investigation that resulted in a GBR, which was 333 
included in the DB RFP. It also allowed the DB contractor to vary the alignment within the 334 
project limits based on post-award investigations that would be made by the successful DB team. 335 
The result was a rare amount of detailed information coupled with the explicit authority to 336 
deviate from the planned alignment to avoid subsurface conditions that might threaten the 337 
integrity of the contractor’s proposed lump sum price. The fact that the project was awarded at a 338 
level of 15% below the engineer’s estimate is testimony to the success of this contractual 339 
approach to managing geotechnical risk during the pre-award phase of DB procurement. 340 
 341 
Not all DB projects have had such a prescient group of agency project delivery teams. The 342 
University Link Light Rail Project (U-Link) in Seattle, Washington provides an interesting 343 
contrast to the Honolulu transit project.  This project however primarily consisted of a tunnel 344 
under Seattle’s Portage Bay. An extensive risk management workshop was conducted during the 345 
preparation of the project’s DB RFP, which resulted in the preparation of an interpretive GBR. 346 
The GBR was incorporated in the RFP, and the agency asked competing design-builders to 347 
provide “suggestions about equitable ways to share [geotechnical] uncertainty” (Clark and Borst 348 
2002). One issue that arose during the outreach was a need for clarifying the “working definition 349 
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of what material deviations from the GBR would constitute a differing site condition, upon 350 
which claims by the contractor would be addressed” (Clark and Borst 2002). After gaining a 351 
better understanding of how industry viewed the geotechnical risk profile, the owner settled on 352 
an approach that required each proposer to address in its proposal a series of “risk statements” by 353 
detailing its plan for addressing each specific risk via its preferred means and methods. The 354 
result was an unexpectedly large amount of effort that had to be invested in reviewing and 355 
evaluating the risk statement responses and as the evaluation panel looked at the risk statements, 356 
“more risks were recognized” (Clark and Borst 2002). In the end, the DB contract was 357 
terminated in 2001 and a decision was made to repackage and re-bid it.  358 
 359 
The U-Link project is an example of an agency that recognized the need for geotechnical risk 360 
management, but in spite of making a valiant effort to develop a mechanism to share it, was 361 
unable to create an approach that filled the need and in the final analysis, one must infer that the 362 
project was not a good candidate for DB project delivery. This inference is borne out by the fact 363 
that portions of the project was eventually completed in 2013 using General Contractor/ 364 
Construction Manager (GC/CM) (Sound 2015). GC/CM (also known as CMGC or CM-at-Risk) 365 
a project delivery method where the contractor participates in the preconstruction design and 366 
planning but is not responsible for the completion of the final design. Additionally, the final 367 
construction cost is negotiated rather that competitively bid, which allows the agency to literally 368 
negotiate the risk allocation with the contractor before fixing the price (West et al. 2012). 369 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS  370 
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Two primary conclusions are supported by the case study analysis and the approaches may be 371 
generalized to other contracts or circumstances. First, the decision to use DB project delivery for 372 
a project with greater than normal geotechnical uncertainty, like the Honolulu Guideway, cannot 373 
be made arbitrarily. The accelerated nature of DB not only shifts the geotechnical design 374 
responsibility to the DB contractor but it also greatly heightens the pressure to complete the 375 
geotechnical investigation and design tasks as quickly as practical to permit the start of early 376 
construction activities. The second conclusion is that DB project delivery can actually be used as 377 
a tool to mitigate the risk and facilitate the speedy resolution of geotechnical issues as was shown 378 
in the Missouri landslide.  379 
The rest of the conclusions are project specific conclusions, highlighting how DB project 380 
delivery was used to resolve specific geotechnical challenges and general conclusions that focus 381 
on the effectiveness of using DB project delivery as a means to resolve geotechnical issues.  382 
The following project specific conclusions can be drawn from the case study analyses: 383 
 Investing the resources to prepare a GBR for a projects with a known high level of 384 
geotechnical variation provides a means to not only reduce the contingencies that must be 385 
included in a DB procurement but also provides an effective means to quantify differing 386 
site conditions if they are encountered. 387 
 The use of selective unit pricing provides an effective means for managing geotechnical 388 
quantity risk. 389 
 The use of a “nested” DB provision that requires a prequalified geotechnical specialty 390 
subcontractor to be a member of the team on a project with known geotechnical issues 391 
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provides an innovative solution to reduce response time to geotechnical issues 392 
unexpectedly arising during DBB project execution. 393 
 O’ahu Elevated Guideway Project: The use of a GBR as a means to allocate subsurface 394 
condition risk appeared to result in cost savings for CCH.  395 
 US 2 Rockfall Mitigation Project: The use of unit price pay items for the uncertain features 396 
of the scope allowed MDT to get as much rockfall mitigation completed as possible for the 397 
available funding. This was particularly significant because this project had a fixed price 398 
and had to be delivered without a contingency for differing site conditions. 399 
 I-270 Slide Repair Project: DB project delivery permitted MoDOT to complete an 400 
emergency slide repair on the I-275 project in significantly less time than two previous 401 
DBB slide repair projects. 402 
 403 
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 404 
The study reported in this paper has found a number of interesting conclusions based on the 405 
rigorous analysis of three case studies. The conclusions are only applicable to the cases 406 
themselves and cannot be reliably generalized to all DB projects. Nevertheless, they do furnish a 407 
set of promising approaches for utilizing DB project delivery to address geotechnical risk and 408 
given the appropriate authority as well as the support by the requisite members of the agency 409 
chain of command provide a decent starting point for resolving individual geotechnical risk 410 
issues. Obviously, attempting to insert a “nested DB clause” into a DBB contract is an action that 411 
will require review and approval as well as the statutory authority to use DB. That being said, the 412 
three cases reported in this paper serve as an example of innovative approaches developed by 413 
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agency professionals to manage the differing site conditions in a manner that keeps it from 414 
devastating a construction budget if the worst possible case is actually realized. 415 
The above discussion leads to a recommendation that a larger, more comprehensive study of 416 
successful geotechnical risk management efforts be conducted to identify effective practices that 417 
can be generalized nationally. The output of that research would probably take the form of 418 
guidelines promulgated by a national sponsor such as the Federal Highway Administration or the 419 
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials. 420 
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